The Thorn in Every Plan for Gaza

Key Findings:

There is an array of plans that have been put out—many of them smart and well-conceived—that contain different ideas for what should replace Hamas; some envision local Palestinian clan leaders or businessmen, some a group comprised of representatives from Arab states, some an international mandate. All of these plans envision creating an arrangement for Gaza that is unconnected to what exists in the West Bank, and given that Gaza now faces a wholly different set of circumstances and that the Palestinian Authority would be in no position to take charge of Gaza tomorrow even if it wanted to, it makes sense to treat it differently. But Palestinians in Gaza do not think of themselves as Gazans; they think of themselves as part of a larger Palestinian nationality.

Planning for governance, security, and deradicalization in Gaza must take into account its inseparable connection to the broader Palestinian context, particularly the West Bank. Treating Gaza in isolation risks perpetuating instability and undermining long-term solutions. Plans for governance in Gaza that ignore the West Bank's political realities are incomplete and unlikely to succeed. Palestinians reject the artificial separation of Gaza and the West Bank, which has been a cornerstone of Israeli policy for years but has failed to gain acceptance among Palestinians.

Because deradicalization of Gaza must also address the West Bank, certain lessons from other historical contexts like post-WWII Germany or counter-radicalization efforts in Saudi Arabia have limited applicability here. Attempts to de-radicalize Gaza while ignoring ongoing occupation and the lack of sovereignty in the West Bank are likely to fail. 

While Palestinians must address internal radicalization, Israel must also confront how its policies contribute to this dynamic. While solving the larger conflict cannot be a prerequisite for action in Gaza, ignoring it will render efforts incomplete and ineffective.