The New Normal Arab-Israeli Normalization and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Key Findings:

The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020 between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and later joined by Sudan and Morocco, marked a pivotal shift in Israel-Arab relations. Prior to these agreements, Israel’s only formal ties with Arab states were limited to cold peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, despite informal business and defense cooperation with other Arab countries against common regional adversaries such as Iran. For decades, the broader Arab world had withheld official recognition of Israel, primarily due to the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the prominence of the Palestinian cause in Arab political discourse. The accords, therefore, represented a departure from the longstanding position that normalization with Israel would be contingent on progress toward Palestinian statehood.

The Abraham Accords have sparked significant debate about their impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Critics contend that the normalization agreements weaken the incentive for Israel to seek a resolution with the Palestinians, as regional acceptance no longer hinges on Israeli-Palestinian peace. By decoupling Arab-Israeli relations from the Palestinian issue, the accords may remove a key leverage point for encouraging Israeli compromises on contentious issues such as East Jerusalem, settlements, and Palestinian self-determination.

However, others argue that the accords present opportunities for the Palestinians. The normalization of relations with several Arab states could facilitate deeper Arab involvement in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and addressing Palestinian concerns. Wealthier states like the UAE could provide humanitarian and development aid to the Palestinians, particularly in Gaza, potentially stabilizing the situation and reducing the risk of conflict. The accords may also elevate the role of Egypt and Jordan, countries that have maintained longstanding peace treaties with Israel, allowing them to take a more active role in Palestinian-related diplomacy.

Despite this potential, the report notes that the normalizing states have shown little interest in taking substantive action to advance the Palestinian cause. The manner in which the Trump administration brokered the deals—focusing on transactional benefits and separating Arab-Israel relations from the Palestinian conflict—reinforced the perception that these states were more interested in geopolitical and economic gains than in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. The fact that these countries established relations with Israel despite long-standing ties suggests that they no longer view the Palestinian issue as central to their engagement with Israel.

While the Biden administration supports a two-state solution, it has shown relatively limited enthusiasm in leveraging the Abraham Accords to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace. Under Trump, Arab states were incentivized to take bold steps toward normalization, which indicates that further U.S. engagement could induce the normalizing countries to play a more active role in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. The Biden administration has the potential to use diplomatic incentives to encourage these states to contribute more directly to resolving the conflict, but this would require proactive leadership from Washington. 

While the Abraham Accords alone are unlikely to lead to Israeli-Palestinian peace, they can be a stepping stone toward a two-state solution if properly harnessed through strategic U.S. diplomacy and increased regional cooperation. Ultimately, the success of using the Abraham Accords to advance Palestinian interests depends on future political dynamics, particularly U.S. efforts to engage Arab states in the peace process.