Digital Library
Pin a Medal on Goldknopf
Topic:
Jewish Diaspora & Interfaith Relations, Israel Literacy
Principal Investigators:
Dr. Shuki Friedman
Study Date:
2022
Source:
Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI)
Key Findings:
The integration of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) community into Israeli society is a pressing challenge with significant implications for the future prosperity of Israel. Current data indicates that the lack of Haredi integration in the labor market and other areas, coupled with their substantial demographic growth, could lead to a decline in Israel's socioeconomic status, resembling that of a third-world country.
Jerusalem serves as a prime example, where the proportion of ultra-Orthodox among the city's Jewish residents has increased to 35%, more than double the Haredi share in Israel overall. This has contributed to a decline in the city's economic status, with higher emigration rates among the secular and more affluent populations.
These trends are not recent; there has been a growing awareness of the challenges for some time. Consequently, the Israeli government, academic institutions, and various organizations have been making efforts over the past two decades to integrate the ultra-Orthodox in all aspects of Israeli life.
Superficial observations might suggest success in integration, as Haredim are encountered in secular areas, participate in academic institutions, work in high-tech and other fields (particularly women), and even serve in the military. The presence of Haredim in the media and on platforms like Twitter further reinforces this perception. However, a deeper examination reveals a darker reality.
With the exception of the relative success in integrating Haredi women into the workforce, other integration efforts have largely failed. Haredi enlistment in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has become a source of ridicule, and despite the significant inequality stemming from their exemption from military service, there seems to be growing indifference among Israelis towards this failure. Integration of Haredim in academia is also struggling, with a negligible proportion of ultra-Orthodox men completing bachelor's degrees. Most do not pursue higher education, and among those who do, the majority (75%) drop out before completion.
Similarly, the integration of Haredi men in the workforce has been largely unsuccessful, with less than half of them employed, earning only 57% of their non-Haredi counterparts' salaries. These challenges have profound consequences for both the Haredi community and the State of Israel, with around 60% of Haredi children living below the poverty line. Additionally, the Haredi tax payment rate is significantly lower (35%) compared to non-Haredim, while the average ultra-Orthodox family receives 54% more National Insurance benefits than the average non-Haredi family.
The failure to achieve meaningful integration is rooted in the continuous resistance of the Haredi community to change and the political efforts of most ultra-Orthodox parties to maintain a subsidized Haredi lifestyle at the expense of Israeli taxpayers. Haredi leaders adopt an ambiguous approach, fiercely protecting their interests in negotiations while presenting a softer image in the public arena, highlighting the few integrated Haredim. This creates a misleading impression that change is imminent, despite the worsening reality.
This serves as a wake-up call for other Israelis, revealing that the current trends are likely to persist and exacerbate. While some ultra-Orthodox have successfully integrated, the rapidly-growing conservative Haredi sector remains largely resistant to change and integration.
Methodology:
The data that inform this op-ed are the result of external investigation.
