On the Third Anniversary of the Abraham Accords

Key Findings:

On September 15, 2020, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords, establishing formal diplomatic relations. This marked the first normalization of relations between Israel and Arab states since its peace treaty with Jordan in 1994. The Accords were later expanded to include Sudan and Morocco.

Gulf Perspective on Success

Sanam Vakil, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, argues that the Accords have provided Bahrain and the UAE with three significant benefits:

(1) Economic and Technological Exchanges: There has been rapid development in bilateral ties with Israel, including a free trade agreement signed by the UAE in April 2023 and visa-free travel.

(2) Security and Intelligence Cooperation: The Accords have facilitated enhanced security collaboration in response to shared threats, particularly from Iran and terrorism.

(3) Long-term Security Assurance from the U.S.: The relationship with the U.S. remains a critical element of Gulf security strategies. The Gulf states also perceive Iran as a long-term threat, and the Accords allow for strategic partnerships with Israel to manage this threat effectively, despite ongoing diplomatic outreach with Tehran.

Israeli Perspective on Success

Shai Feldman, Raymond Frankel Professor at Brandeis University, views the Accords as a significant U.S.-mediated Israeli achievement that represents the fifth major breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict resolution process. The Accords broadened Israel's acceptance in the region and deepened its relations with Arab states through various agreements spanning economic, scientific, technological, and security domains.

Implications for Israeli-Palestinian Relations

Feldman notes that the Accords further shifted the balance of power in favor of Israel by normalizing relations with Arab states without addressing Palestinian conditions outlined in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. The acceptance of Israel by key Arab states has diminished Palestinian leverage in negotiations and exacerbated their feelings of betrayal.

Impact of Israeli Politics on the Accords

Right-Wing Government's Influence

Vakil points out that the current Netanyahu-led coalition government has caused some slowdown in the public embrace of Israel by Gulf states due to its Palestinian policies, particularly the expansion of settlements in the West Bank. However, the core implementations of the Accords have continued, as Gulf states have shown restraint in their reactions to Israeli-Palestinian violence, at least for now.

Feldman adds that although the Israeli government’s actions have aggravated Palestinian sentiments of betrayal, they have not halted the Accords' implementation. Future violence, especially if it occurs in sensitive areas like Jerusalem, could prompt a stronger reaction from the Accords states.

Prospects of Israeli-Saudi Normalization

Feldman asserts that the Accords have created a more favorable environment for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. However, King Salman remains cautious due to the conditions of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, particularly regarding Palestinian rights.

Vakil emphasizes that achieving normalization will be complex and will require substantial political commitments from Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. Key challenges include negotiating Saudi Arabia's civilian nuclear program, potential defense agreements, and resolving issues surrounding a two-state solution for Palestine. She argues that significant concessions regarding Palestine are likely necessary for Saudi leadership to proceed with normalization, showcasing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s leadership.

Conclusion

The Abraham Accords have led to significant diplomatic and economic developments in the Gulf region while reshaping Israeli-Palestinian dynamics. Despite the potential for expanded normalization, especially with Saudi Arabia, various political, security, and ideological challenges remain.