Missed Signals that Led to a Strategic Surprise Israeli Arab Riots in 2021

Key Findings:

This publication explores how strategic surprises may result from other internal issues. It considers the challenge of assessing signals that are not distinct and alerting decision-makers as early as possible.

Historically, Israel's national security was primarily focused on external dangers, as reflected in its defense strategies, such as deterrence, early warning, and decisive military victories, developed in the context of conflicts with neighboring states. However, recent events — like the Second Intifada in 2000 and the May 2021 riots — highlight the growing significance of internal unrest, especially among Israeli Arabs and Palestinians. 

The outbreak of the October 2000 riots and the subsequent events exemplify the difficulties in counterintelligence and strategic surprise in managing internal unrest, particularly within minority populations. Despite early warnings and intelligence assessments, the Israeli government and security agencies were unprepared for the scope and intensity of the riots that erupted among Israeli Arabs. These events were sparked by Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000, which was seen as a provocation and set off the Second Intifada. The subsequent violent demonstrations and unrest inside Israel among its Arab citizens reflected deeper, unresolved grievances, such as economic disparities, political marginalization, and discrimination.

The Or Commission, established to investigate the riots, revealed that warnings of potential unrest among Israeli Arabs were available months before the outbreak of violence. However, these warnings were not adequately shared or acted upon by security agencies like the Israel Security Agency (ISA). The commission highlighted how Israeli Arabs, frustrated by systemic inequalities and perceived neglect, became increasingly alienated, leading to the eruption of the riots. Furthermore, the ISA’s focus on preventing terrorism and subversion meant that it was not well-positioned to address the broader public order issues that fueled the riots, leaving the Israel Police unprepared to handle the situation effectively.

The failure to prevent the October 2000 riots is a critical case study in strategic surprise, illustrating the complexity of accurately assessing the moods and intentions of minority groups. Despite ongoing social and political tensions, significant recommendations from the Or Commission were not fully implemented, leading to similar strategic surprises.

The outbreak of the May 2021 riots, coinciding with Operation “Guardian of the Walls,” also presented Israel with a significant internal security challenge. Intelligence assessments leading up to the riots failed to adequately predict the scale and intensity of the violence that erupted among Israeli Arabs in mixed cities, despite a recognized rise in tensions. The primary drivers behind the riots were multifaceted: tensions surrounding the Al-Aqsa Mosque, disputes over Sheikh Jarrah, and a deeper historical narrative related to the Nakba and the right of return. These factors, combined with rocket fire from Hamas, ignited widespread violence.

Despite early indications of rising tensions in the Arab sector, the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) and police were taken by surprise by the scale of the riots. The ISA’s focus on localized unrest in Jerusalem, rather than the potential for widespread violence in mixed cities, contributed to a delayed response. The complexity of monitoring large minority populations and detecting “weak signals” of unrest highlighted deficiencies in Israel’s internal security apparatus.

Intelligence agencies like the Israel Security Agency (ISA) must enhance their methods for detecting and interpreting weak signals, particularly those related to political subversion, terrorism, and the grievances of the Arab population in Israel. While Israel's internal security apparatus is strong, the increasing political influence of the Arab minority and their deep-seated frustrations require new strategies and a more nuanced approach to maintaining national security, especially in sensitive areas like Jerusalem.