Israeli Deterrence and the October 7 Attack

Key Findings:

This policy analysis examines both the strategic failure of deterrence against Hamas and why Israel persisted with this strategy. It is argued that Israel’s failure to adapt its approach stems partly from its entrenched self-perception as a deterrent power. This identity led policymakers to overestimate deterrence’s effectiveness and overlook shifting regional dynamics, such as normalization with Arab states and Palestinian frustrations.

The October 7th attack not only challenged Israel’s physical security but also its self-image. The attack exposed major flaws in Israel’s long-standing reliance on deterrence as a core security strategy. Despite repeated cycles of violence and signs that Hamas was not meaningfully deterred, Israel continued to treat deterrence as the centerpiece of its approach. 

Israel had long relied on a twofold deterrence strategy: deterrence by punishment—threatening and implementing harsh military reprisals—and deterrence by denial—preventing attacks through technological and physical barriers like the Iron Dome and border fortifications. 

Hamas not only launched a large-scale and brutal assault but had also spent years preparing for such an operation, fully anticipating Israel’s military response. The failure of deterrence by denial was partly due to Hamas's tactical ingenuity, which enabled it to bypass Israeli defenses. Iron Dome, though effective at intercepting rockets, paradoxically incentivized Hamas by reducing the consequences of its attacks while exhausting Israeli resources. 

The more profound failure, however, was in deterrence by punishment. Despite Israel’s superior military power and past retaliatory operations, Hamas proceeded with an attack it knew would provoke massive Israeli retaliation. Evidence shows that Hamas had planned the attack well in advance and was prepared for the fallout, suggesting that it either did not believe in the credibility of Israel’s threats or considered the likely consequences as acceptable, or even advantageous.

This defiance raises questions about assumptions in deterrence theory, especially regarding actors with state-like characteristics. Hamas, while not a state, governs Gaza and has responsibilities to its population. It was assumed that such organizations would be more sensitive to deterrent threats due to their need for legitimacy and concern for civilian welfare. 

However, Hamas’s actions contradicted this logic, as it risked its governance, regional relations, and international legitimacy by launching an exceptionally brutal attack. The motivations may lie in shifting strategic calculations. Israeli internal political crises, including weakened governance and societal division, possibly undermined the credibility of its deterrent posture. Additionally, regional developments—especially the normalization of relations between Israel and Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia—signaled to Hamas a diminishing relevance of the Palestinian cause. This eroding status quo may have driven Hamas to act, aiming to reassert the Palestinian issue on the global agenda through dramatic escalation.