Digital Library
Hamas and the New Great Game
Topic:
Israel Literacy
Principal Investigators:
Tomer Dekel
Study Date:
2024
Source:
Institute for National Security Studies
Key Findings:
This article explores how global attitudes toward Israel in its conflict with Hamas are deeply shaped by geopolitical and energy-related interests. The competition over energy corridors, pipelines, and infrastructure projects has fueled what is termed the “New Great Game,” echoing 19th-century imperial rivalries, but now involving the US, NATO, China, Russia, and regional players.
In the wake of the October 7, 2023 attacks, nations responded in diverse and often surprising ways, with the U.S. and other Western powers strongly backing Israel, while countries like Iran and others in the Shiite axis immediately condemned it. Interestingly, some Sunni-majority states such as Saudi Arabia criticized Hamas, and global powers like China and Russia, despite lacking ideological alignment in the conflict, condemned Israel. These responses are closely tied to broader strategic interests—especially the global struggle for control over energy resources and transportation corridors, a modern “Great Game” unfolding across Central Asia and the Middle East.
Oil, gas, and increasingly solar and hydrogen-based fuels are essential to national security and economic power. The global competition to control energy corridors (including vital maritime choke points like the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, and the Strait of Malacca) has turned these regions into flashpoints for geopolitical rivalry. Control over these routes provides countries with leverage and security, and also influences alliances and response to conflicts.
Israel has been historically isolated from regional energy cooperation due to political conflicts. Israel's geography places it along key land and sea corridors, but it has long struggled to become a transit country or regional energy hub. Efforts such as the British-era Mosul–Haifa pipeline and the Iran-backed Eilat–Ashkelon pipeline were undermined by wars and political upheaval. Only in recent decades, through peace with Egypt and gas partnerships, has Israel begun to integrate into regional energy networks—although these too have faced disruptions, including jihadist attacks on Sinai pipelines post-Arab Spring.
In the months before October 2023, several major infrastructure projects aimed at diversifying energy routes and reducing dependence on unstable maritime passages advanced. These included pipelines linking Israel to Cyprus and Egypt, undersea power interconnections, and a US-backed rail corridor connecting Israel with Gulf states and Europe. Such developments are part of the broader geopolitical contest, where the US and its allies seek to weaken Russian energy dominance over Europe (especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which targeted energy-rich Ukrainian regions and transit routes). In response, Europe launched the REPowerEU plan to source energy from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, and made Israel a crucial hub.
Moreover, the “New Silk Road” and the broader geopolitical landscape revolve around the intense strategic rivalry between the US and China. Israel, seeking to diversify its alliances beyond the US—especially amid tensions during the Obama era—pursued closer ties with China, engaging in trade, joint investments, technology collaboration, and infrastructure projects like the Chinese-led Haifa Bay Port. Israel aimed to become a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vast infrastructure project connecting China to Europe via land and sea routes to secure energy supplies and reduce dependence on chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca. However, Israel’s role in the BRI has been limited compared to larger Central Asian countries like Iran and Russia, which hold strategic energy resources and align more closely with China against Western influence. Qatar and other Gulf states have also become key targets of China’s investments and partnerships within the BRI framework, partly as a hedge against regional rivalries and US uncertainty.
In response, the US launched a competing initiative, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, building on the Abraham Accords and aiming to strengthen ties among Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other partners through infrastructure like pipelines, railways, and communication cables. This corridor is part of the broader US “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” designed to counter China’s growing power across Asia and Eurasia.
Countries like Qatar have aligned with Iran and China despite sectarian differences due to shared energy interests, while Saudi Arabia balances its Sunni alliance and US support with cautious engagement with Israel, influenced by potential infrastructure projects and regional security. Egypt’s ambivalence reflects its economic dependence on Israeli gas and US military support, despite regional and ideological opposition to Israel and concerns over losing control of key routes like the Suez Canal. Jordan similarly relies on Israeli energy despite political criticism of Israel.
European countries’ stances on Israel vary according to their energy dependencies and political alignments. Nations like Ukraine, Germany, and Greece support Israel partly due to opposition to Russia and strategic energy interests, while others with less dependence on the US or more left-leaning governments take more critical positions, sometimes to appeal to Muslim populations or for ideological reasons.
Methodology:
Strategic Assessment: A Multidisciplinary Journal on National Security is a journal published by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). It aims to challenge and to enrich the scholarly debate and public discourse on a range of subjects related to national security in the broadest sense of the term. Along with its focus on Israel and the Middle East, the journal includes articles on national security in the international arena. Academic and research-based articles are joined by policy papers, professional forums, academic surveys, and book reviews, and are written by INSS researchers and guest contributors. The views presented are those of the authors alone.
