Understanding Israel's New Anti-UNRWA Laws

Key Findings:

The Israeli Knesset’s recent passage of two laws targeting the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) marks a transformative moment in the agency’s ability to operate in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. These laws aim to dismantle UNRWA’s role following serious allegations of ties between the organization and participation in the massacres of October 7.

Israel’s anti-UNRWA laws reflect its long-standing grievances with the agency, including accusations of perpetuating the Palestinian refugee crisis and ties to terrorist groups. However, the legislation risks deepening the humanitarian crisis and creating security and operational challenges without a viable alternative in place. The period that follows will be critical in determining whether Israel, international actors, or UNRWA itself can navigate these changes without precipitating greater instability in an already volatile region.

Legislative Actions

(1) Ban on UNRWA Operations in Israeli Territory 

Key Provisions: (1A) Prohibits UNRWA from operating within sovereign Israeli territory, including East Jerusalem; (1B) Enforces the closure of UNRWA’s East Jerusalem headquarters in Ma’alot Dafna.

Immediate Impacts: Particularly affects the Shuafat Refugee Camp in East Jerusalem, where UNRWA has provided critical services to residents in a legally and administratively ambiguous area.

(2) Severing Israeli-UNRWA Ties

Key Provisions: (2A) Terminates the 1967 Comay-Michelmore Agreement, which allowed UNRWA to function in the West Bank and Gaza through Israeli cooperation; (2B) Bans contact between Israeli officials and UNRWA representatives; (2C) Ends Israeli commitments to ensure the safety of UNRWA’s personnel, facilities, and goods.

Immediate Impacts: Restricts entry visas for UNRWA’s international staff and prevents the import and movement of goods through Israeli borders.

Implications

(1) Operational Challenges

(1A) Israeli banks will face legal and logistical difficulties working with UNRWA, affecting payroll and supply chains critical for the agency’s operations; (1B) International staff may struggle to secure entry visas, complicating field operations and managerial oversight; (1C) The ban on coordination with Israeli customs threatens to paralyze the importation and movement of goods, which UNRWA relies on for humanitarian aid delivery.

(2) Humanitarian Consequences

(2A) In Gaza: Gaza’s 2.1 million residents, 90% of whom are displaced, depend heavily on UNRWA’s food, water, and medical services. Disruption of these services amid an ongoing humanitarian crisis could worsen the population’s suffering. UNRWA remains uniquely positioned with local expertise, infrastructure, and trust among Palestinian communities. Its sidelining could destabilize ongoing relief efforts.

(2B) In the West Bank: UNRWA services are critical for a population grappling with high unemployment (30% overall, up to 60% in refugee camps) and worsening socioeconomic conditions. Job losses among UNRWA staff (teachers, healthcare workers) could lead to further radicalization and unrest, particularly among youth deprived of education and social programs.

(3) Socioeconomic Destabilization: 

UNRWA provides food aid, welfare payments, and other essential services to 913,000 beneficiaries in the West Bank. Service disruptions could exacerbate poverty, hunger, and social tensions.

Security Concerns

UNRWA coordinates closely with the Israeli military (IDF) to avoid operational conflicts in refugee camps. Severing this contact increases the risk of accidental clashes in densely populated areas with militant activity. Disruption of civil-military coordination could hinder IDF operations and heighten security risks for soldiers and civilians.

Disbanding UNRWA without an immediate replacement risks chaos in refugee camps, leading to law-and-order challenges and increased militant activity.

Alternatives and Challenges

(1) Israel could directly take over UNRWA’s humanitarian functions, but this would impose heavy financial and logistical burdens and carry significant political risks. It also risks international condemnation and domestic backlash.

(2) Expand the role for other U.N. Agencies or INGOs (the World Food Programme have already begun taking on limited roles in Gaza). However, these agencies lack the infrastructure, local networks, and expertise to fully replace UNRWA, especially in the West Bank.

(3) Delegating responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority (PA) is unlikely, given Israeli opposition to PA involvement in Gaza and the PA’s reluctance to assume additional burdens without political concessions. This option risks further eroding the PA’s credibility among Palestinians.

(4) UNRWA could attempt to adapt its operations through indirect methods, such as channeling services via third parties or relocating operations outside Israeli-controlled areas. These workaround measures, however, would be technically and logistically complex.

(5) If no alternative is established within the 90-day implementation period, the humanitarian void left by UNRWA’s absence could lead to widespread suffering, increased tensions, and a further breakdown of stability in Palestinian territories.