The “Quagmire” Then and Now Lessons for Combat in the Gaza Strip and for Decision Making from the IDF’s Presence in Lebanon Until its Withdrawal to the Awali in October 1983

Key Findings:

This publication examines the lessons from the IDF’s presence in Lebanon (1982-1983) in the context of the current conflict in Gaza and the potential escalation in Lebanon. It highlights similarities in decision-making, public sentiment, and consequences between the two periods, stressing the importance of learning from past mistakes.

In 1982, following the First Lebanon War, the IDF did not fully withdraw from Lebanon until 2000, despite achieving its initial goal of removing the rocket threat to northern Israel. The prolonged presence resulted in significant casualties and strengthened Hezbollah, creating long-term security challenges for Israel.

The outbreak of the First Lebanon War differed fundamentally from the current Swords of Iron war, which began with the attack on October 7, 2023 by Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups and individuals. However, both conflicts aimed to eliminate a direct military threat. The publication draws parallels in the challenges of securing military achievements and preventing the return of threats after initial victories.

Political agreements with Lebanon failed to secure lasting peace, and the continued IDF presence in Lebanon fostered hostility. A major argument for staying was the fear that withdrawal would signal weakness, a sentiment echoed in current discussions about Gaza. The issue of captives and missing persons also influenced decisions to continue military operations.

The belief that maintaining military pressure would lead to political gains was prevalent, despite increasing attacks on IDF soldiers. Partial withdrawals were often seen as insufficient, not addressing the real security threats. The debate over the war's necessity and effectiveness mirrored the current societal divisions in Israel.

The publication highlights the increasing prominence of casualty issues during the war, particularly after the IDF's capture of territories in Lebanon in June 1982. Initially, there was little public outrage over the casualties, despite the significant numbers. However, as the perception grew that the IDF's presence in Lebanon was unnecessary, protests began to focus on the casualties as victims of a failed policy. Defense Minister Sharon even requested media to downplay reports of fallen soldiers to minimize public anger.

A Pentagon report which gained traction in the media, revealed that about 20% of the IDF's losses were due to Israeli shelling and bombing. This further intensified public scrutiny. The discourse about casualties became central, and influenced political decisions such as Prime Minister Begin's resignation in October 1983.

The strain on reserve soldiers, called up multiple times, contributed significantly to the protests, with movements like Peace Now, composed of reserve officers and soldiers, playing a pivotal role. The tragic grenade attack on a Peace Now protest, killing Emil Grunzweig, marked a violent turn in the public dissent.

Regarding Israel–US relations then and now, the Reagan administration opposed the invasion of Lebanon out of concern about its regional impacts and harm to US interests. This echoes current US concerns about Israel's actions in Gaza. The US today supports Israel against Hamas but cautions against actions that could strain regional relations.

The IDF faced internal challenges, with disagreements among senior officers and between the military and political leadership, affecting morale and operational decisions. The presence in Lebanon led to a significant crisis in the IDF, impacting volunteer rates for officer positions and permanent service, highlighting the long-term effects of the conflict.

The ongoing conflict in Gaza mirrors these historical issues about Lebanon — societal division, debates over war objectives, and the political-military establishment's reluctance to withdraw from contentious territories.