Can Israel's political strife be solved by a 'thin' constitution?

Key Findings:

The article discusses the Israeli national crisis and the need for "big ideas" to address the country's future. It examines three proposed solutions: comprehensive judicial reform, a full constitution, and cantonization. The author argues that these proposals are unrealistic and instead proposes a "thin constitution" as a more feasible option.

The judicial reform, introduced by Justice Minister Yariv Levin, ignited the culture war in Israeli society and revealed deep divisions. The aggressively-marketed proposed reforms disrupted the fabric of national life and intensified identity discord. Even if a compromise is reached, the underlying identity crisis remains unresolved and will likely resurface.

The article highlights the neglect of fundamental questions of Israeli society, such as the relationship between Jewish particularism and liberal-democratic universalism. The focus on territorial issues overshadowed discussions on the state's internal structure.

In recent years, identity politics has gained prominence and has led to controversies regarding religion, nationality, ethnicity, and geography. The Israeli Center as a political faction remained complacent until the judicial reform proposal threatened its position in the culture war.

The author presents two contrasting proposals: a constitution and cantonization. A constitution aims to establish a new social order and secure broad consensus on the state's identity and fundamental principles. It would limit the extremes of identity groups seeking to impose their will. Cantonization suggests organizing Israel into autonomous regions for different identity groups, allowing them to manage their own affairs independently.

However, the author argues that both proposals are unfeasible and would worsen the crisis. A constitution requires a broad consensus on identity and values that is currently unattainable. Cantonization would deepen divisions and intensify competition among identity groups.

Instead, the author advocates for a "thin" constitution, focusing on the regulation of government branches, the presidency, state comptroller, state budget, and the military. It does not address identity-related matters but sets the rules for the state's operation. The current reliance on Basic Laws, which can be easily amended, undermines Israeli democracy and opens the door to political manipulation.

Implementing a "thin" constitution would provide stability and protect against arbitrary changes by future governments. It would allow for a mutually agreeable framework for managing conflicts without engaging in the divisive culture war. The uncertain future composition of the Knesset and the Supreme Court presents an opportunity for impartial discussions and fair decisions.

This article emphasizes the need for Israeli leadership to move away from revolutionary reforms and embrace a long-term solution based on a "thin" constitution, which can provide a safe haven for managing the culture war.